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conditional seller to the repairs. In fact, he may well oppose repairs where, as
in the instant case, they might equal or exceed the sale price of the automobile.
"Might it not be better to recognize openly that the claim of the subsequent
mechanic or serviceman is not based on authority from the mortgagor or vendor
at all, but on quasi-contractual principles?" 20 This realistic approach would
permit the repairman to recover for services rendered or repairs made, but it
would necessarily limit the conditional seller's bill for repairs to the reasonable
amount by which such repairs benefited him, as opposed to the price for which
the repairman had agreed to make the repairs. In view of the unquestioned in-
tent of the legislature in enacting section 184, the decision reached in the
instant case seems unavoidable. However, it is submitted for the reasons stated
above, that the considerations employed by the Court to support this result are
open to serious doubt.
Ronald L. Fancher
TAXATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LICENSE FEES RECOVERABLE IN ABSENCE or FORMAL
PROTEST
Five Boros Electrical Contractors Association brought an action against
the City of New York-to recover excessive amounts paid as license fees. The
license fees had been held unconstitutional on the ground that they were not
reasonably related to the cost of services involved in issuing the licenses.' Five
Boros obtained judgment on the pleadings in the trial court, which judgment
was affirmed by the Appellate Division.2 On appeal by permission of the Court
of Appeals, held, affirmed, since these unconstitutionally exorbitant payments
were made under duress and compulsion (i.e., to protect plaintiff's right to con-
tinue to carry on business in the city) they were involuntary payments and
thus recoverable even in the absence of formal protest. Five Boros Elec. Con-
tractors Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 146, 187 N.E.2d 774, 237
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1963).
A voluntary payment of a tax or fee imposed by an unconstitutional or
illegally excessive law, where there is knowledge of all matters of fact but
ignorance of the law's unconstitutionality or illegality, cannot be recovered.8
This generally accepted rule of law is based on several policy considerations.
That "ignorance of the law doesn't constitute a ground for relief"; that "only
20. Brown, op. cit. supra note 2, at 541.
1. Alderstein v. City of New York, 6 N.Y.2d 740, 158 N.E.2d 512, 185 N.Y.S.2d
821 (1959).
2. Five Boro Elec. Contractors Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 14 A.D.2d 679, 219
N.Y.S.2d 985 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. Adrico Realty ,Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732 (1928).
Contra, Flower v. State, 143 App. Div. 871, 128 N.Y. Supp. 208 (3d Dep't 1911).
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the legislative branch is authorized to allow repayment of funds once paid into
the treasury"; that "the taxpayer has already received benefits from funds paid
into and expended by the government"; and lastly that, "to permit recovery
would disrupt governmental finance"; are the considerations weighed by the
courts in such actions.4
An involuntary payment of an illegally excessive tax or fee, however, may
be recovered upon later discovery of that illegality. Such involuntary payment
upon which recovery may be predicated is characterized by the elements of pro-
test against the levy or of duress and compulsion. 5 Generally, in the absence of
statute, protest alone appears insufficient to make a payment involuntary,
6
although in New York there is some tendency to consider protest per se as being
sufficient to characterize a payment involuntary." Protest is not essential to
recovery in cases involving payments made under duress and compulsion.8 In
summary the chief functions of protest are to indicate the payor's belief as to
illegality and to aid in determining the involuntary nature of payments in
questionable cases.9 An illegal exaction procured through compulsion or duress
may be recovered by the payor. 10 Compulsion or duress (the terms are used
interchangeably by the courts) occurs where a person is induced to act by the
unlawful action of another so as to deprive him of his free will in that act.1
Under this rule, payments illegally demanded and involuntarily paid to protect
the payor from arrest,' 2 or to protect his possession of goods and property,'
8
were held to be under duress, and recoverable.
This protection has been extended to cases where illegal payments were
exacted and paid to protect business and employment rights under the doctrine
of business comuplsion; 14 and, it has been held that undue interference with
the conduct of business or occupation through an obstructive use of taxing or
licensing powers constitutes duress.15 New York courts have allowed the re-
covery of payments made under duress where the only alternatives were sub-
mission to an illegal exaction or discontinuance of business. 16 While not invoking
a specific business compulsion rule, the New York courts have applied general
4. See Field, The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 501,
512-16 (1932).
5. See Annot., 48 AL.R. 1381 (1927); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1301 (1931).
6. Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U.S. 253 (1904); Steffen v. State, 19 S.D.
314, 103 N.W. 44 (1905).
7. See Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 910, 50 N.E.2d
301 (1943).
8. Whyte v. State, 110 Cal. App. 314, 294 Pac. 417 (1930).
9. Field, supra note 4, at 524.
10. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 9, 10 (1929).
11. Adams v. Irving Nat'l Bank, 116 N.Y. 606, 23 N.E. 7 (1889).
12. Buckley v. Mayor of City of New York, 30 App. Div. 463, 52 N.Y. Supp. 452
(1st Dep't 1898).
13. Peysor v. Mayor of City of New York, 70 N.Y. 497 (1877).
14. Swift Co. v. United States, 111 U.S. 22, 28 (1884).
15. American Dist. Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 578, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 262 (1st Dep't 1925).
16. Buckley v. Mayor of City of New York, 30 App. Div. 463, 52 N.Y. Supp. 452
(1st Dep't 1898).
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duress principles to grant the recovery of illegal payments made to protect
the right to remain in business (licenses and franchises17), as well as to protect
the means necessary to engage in business (liens on real estate' 8 and terms of
employment contract' 9 ).
In the instant case the Court of Appeals has taken the doctrine of allowing
recovery in cases of duress where payments were made to protect present liberty
of person 20 and possession of goods2 ' and applied it to circumstances involving
the protection of business rights. This has been done before,22 but the Court in
this case went further than had previous courts. It did not consider the pro-
tection of the right to employment or business as within a vague concept of
property right, but considered it as a fundamental and basic personal liberty
necessary to the interests of society and as such, worthy of protection in its own
name and for its own sake. In effect, the court declared the right to work or
do business such an important personal and social right that any attempt to
obstruct such right can be nullified.
In formulating its "business compulsion" doctrine the court overruled any-
thing contrary found in the cases of Sloan Estates Inc. v. City of New York 2a
and Maquire v. New York. 4 The Sloan and Maquire decisions do not treat
the subject of duress at all, and the only nexus with Five Boros is that all
three cases deal with the recovery of illegal payments. The Sloan case stands
for the proposition that legal assessments may be recovered where there is
protest as provided for by statute, and Maquire holds that voluntary payments
may not be recovered. These propositions, consistent with the law in most
jurisdictions, are accepted in the instant case. It is possible that this Court
desired to express its disapproval of the decision in the Sloan case as being
based on protest rather than on duress principles, but in any event the law in
the "overruled cases" seems in no way to be contrary to that of the instant
case. These "overrulings" notwithstanding, the holding of the New York Court
of Appeals in the instant case seems clearly within the trend of the decisions
of the majority of other jurisdictions regarding business compulsion. 25
Joseph S. Forma
17. American Dist. Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 578, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 262 (1st Dep't 1925).
18. People ex rel. Wessel v. Craig, 236 N.Y. 100, 140 N.E. 209 (1923).
19. Homer v. State, 42 App. Div. 430, 59 N.Y. Supp. 96 (3d Dep't 1899).
20. Buckley v. Mayor of City of New York, 30 App. Div. 463, 52 N.Y. Supp. 452
(1st Dep't 1898).
21. Peysor v. Mayor of City of New York, 70 N.Y. 497 (1877).
22. Buckley v. Mayor of City of New York, 30 App. Div. 463, 52 N.Y. Supp. 452
(1st Dep't 1898).
23. 287 N.Y. 818, 41 N.E.2d 95 (1942).
24. 273 N.Y. 665, 8 N.E.2d 337 (1937).
25. Sneed v. Snapper Oil & Refining Co., 35 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1929); Flynn v.
San Francisco, 18 Cal. 2d 210, 115 P.2d 3 (1941); State v. Atkins Prods. Co., 155 Tex.
348, 286 S.W.2d 110 (1956); Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. State, 160 Wash. 538, 295
Pac. 748 (1931).
